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Abstract
This paper outlines the IoT Databox model as a means of making the Internet of Things (IoT) accountable to individuals.
Accountability is a key to building consumer trust and is mandated by the European Union’s general data protection regulation
(GDPR). We focus here on the ‘external’ data subject accountability requirement specified by GDPR and how meeting this
requirement turns on surfacing the invisible actions and interactions of connected devices and the social arrangements in which
they are embedded. The IoT Databox model is proposed as an in principle means of enabling accountability and providing
individuals with the mechanisms needed to build trust into the IoT.
Keywords GDPR · Accountability · Internet of Things (IoT) · IoT Databox
1 Introduction
The European Union has introduced new general data pro-
tection regulation (GDPR), which comes into effect in May
2018 and is explicitly concerned to handle the threat to pri-
vacy occasioned by the emerging digital ecosystem.
“Rapid technological developments and globalisation
have brought new challenges for the protection of per-
sonal data. The scale of the collection and sharing of
personal data has increased significantly … … … the
proliferation of actors and the technological complex-
ity of practice makes it difficult for the data subject to
know and understand whether, by whom and for what
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purpose personal data relating to him or her are being
collected.” [12]
A key driver of this rapid technological development and
technological complexity is the Internet of Things:
“an infrastructure in which billions of sensors embed-
ded in common, everyday devices … are designed to
communicate unobtrusively and exchange data in a
seamless way … clearly raises new and significant per-
sonal data protection and privacy challenges” [34]
GDPR, thus, seeks to put in place measures to address these
challenges. Key amongst them is the accountability require-
ment.
The accountability principle [31] requires any organiza-
tion that controls personal data processing, which includes
collecting, using, retaining, disclosing and/or disposing of it,
by wholly or partly automated means for professional or com-
mercial purposes, and which otherwise provides persons with
the means (e.g., cloud-based services) for processing per-
sonal data for their own household purposes [12, paragraph
18], be able to demonstrate compliance with GDPR. Failure
to do so may result in ‘administrative fines’ up to ¤20,000,000
or 4% of total annual worldwide turnover, whichever is
greater. The consequences of ignoring GDPR are severe, and
the IoT is no exception.
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It might be argued that, while significant, GDPR only
applies in Europe. However, if we consider the ‘territorial
scope’ of the regulation, it is clear that any such argument is
misplaced.
“This Regulation applies to the processing of personal
data … where the processing relates to … the offering
of goods or services to … data subjects in the Union
… or the monitoring of their behaviour as far as their
behaviour takes place within the Union … … regardless
of whether the processing takes place in the Union or
not.” [12]
The accountability requirement has global relevance then,
and this paper seeks to articulate what it amounts to in
practical terms for the Internet of Things, and to define a
computational model that responds to the requirement and
thus builds accountability into the IoT.1
Were we to define accountability then we would say that
it (a) requires any organization controlling data processing
to put policies, procedures and systems in place to demon-
strate toitself that its processing operations comply with the
requirements of data protection regulation. This ‘internal’
focus is emphasized by data protection guidance [e.g., [15]],
and may be provided for through such tools as privacy impact
assessments (PIAs) [35]. Less pronounced at first glance,
though equally as important, is (b) the ‘external’ dimension
of accountability, which requires that a data processing entity
demonstrate to others, particularly regulatory authorities and
individual data subjects, that its data processing operations
comply with regulation. Internal and external demonstrations
are not isomorphic. Thus, accountability cannot be reduced
to showing that a PIA has been carried out. More is required,
especially with respect to making data processing account-
able to the individual.
Below we unpack the external data subject accountabil-
ity requirement and how it has been translated into practical
recommendations for IoT developers by the Article 29 Data
Protection Working Party [34], which is set to become the
powerful European Data Protection Board under GDPR.
These recommendations seek to enable individual control
over the flow of personal data through the design of computa-
tional mechanisms that enable consent as an ongoing matter,
make data processing transparent, and permit fine-grained
data flow management, online access and data portability.
1 The global relevance of the accountability requirement is further
underscored by US legislation. While new data protection law appears to
be terminally ‘bogged down’ in the US [27], the accountability require-
ment is enshrined in existing Fair Information Practices [11], and the
Federal Trade Commission has been proactive in championing data sub-
ject accountability in the IoT [10]. Add to this the Japanese effort to
‘harmonise’ its data protection regulation with international law [28]
and it becomes clear that the accountability requirement is poised to
exert considerable force on the IoT, whether developers like it or not.
Satisfying the external data subject accountability require-
ment requires that we surface and articulate hidden aspects
of the IoT ecosystem [38]: not only machine-to-machine
or M2M actions and interactions but also, and importantly,
the social arrangements connected devices are embedded in
[26], for it is not only the data collected by Internet-enabled
‘things’ that must be made accountable but also what is done
with the data and by whom.
We outline the IoT Databox model as a means of surfacing
device actions and interactions, and the social or cooperative
arrangements they are embedded in, to enable accountabil-
ity. The IoT Databox is an edge device that is intended to
be situated within the home, a key sector for IoT develop-
ment [20]. It collates data from IoT devices, either directly
or via APIs, and makes them available to ‘apps’ that enable
data processing and actuation. Data processing takes place
on-the-box. Moving computation to the data at the edge of
the network, rather than data to centralized processing ‘in the
cloud’, has a range of potential benefits which are particu-
larly relevant to the IoT and drive the shift to edge and fog
computing [18,30]. These include low latency (data does not
have to be moved to and from remote data centres), resilience
(actuation does not need to rely on continuous connectivity),
efficiency (centralised data processing costs are significantly
reduced), and data minimisation (only the results of process-
ing queries are distributed). Making the IoT accountable may,
then, have manifold advantages, which also includes opening
up data that is currently distributed across manifold silos to
innovation on-the-box.
2 The external accountability requirement
The external accountability requirement plays a key role in
the processing of ‘personal data’, i.e., any data that relate
to an identified or identifiable person, including data gen-
erated by connected devices. It requires, by definition, that
data processing operations are demonstrably complaint with
regulation. This includes, but is not limited, to the following.
Data minimisation Article 5 GDPR requires that the pro-
cessing of personal data is limited to what is necessary to
meet the purposes for which they are collected and is thus
conducted under the auspices of the ‘data minimisation’ prin-
ciple.
Lawfulness of processing Article 6 GDPR specifies that
data processing should also be lawful. The processing of per-
sonal data is considered lawful to the extent that at least one
of the following applies. It is necessary for a controller to
process personal data (a) in exercising official authority or
performing a task carried out in the public interest, (b) com-
plying with a legal obligation, (c) protecting the vital interests
of the data subject, (d) pursuing the legitimate interests of an
organisation, or (e) fulfilling a contract. Otherwise, process-
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ing is only lawful if the data subject has given consent to
the processing of his or her personal data for specific pur-
poses.
Fairness of processing Given the manifold grounds upon
which processing may lawfully conducted it may sound on
the face of it that just about anything goes, especially given
the ‘legitimate interests’ clause. However, Article 5 GDPR
also specifies that data processing must be fair.
“Fairness generally requires you to be transparent—
clear and open with individuals about how their infor-
mation will be used. Transparency is always important,
but especially so in situations where individuals have
a choice about whether they wish to enter into a rela-
tionship with you.” [16]
Consent, thus, becomes a key ingredient in the process-
ing of personal data, especially where consumer-oriented
IoT devices and services are concerned, insofar as it makes
data processing transparent and allows individuals to make
informed choices.
Information to be provided to the data subject The pro-
cessing of personal also requires certain information be
provided to the data subject. This includes the specific pur-
poses of data processing, what data are required, and by
whom. Article 13 GDPR also requires that data subjects be
informing of any other recipients of their data and the legiti-
mate interests those recipients pursue, including the transfer
of data to an international organisation or third country for
processing (ibid.). If the data are to be transferred then indi-
viduals must be informed of the ‘safeguards’ that have been
put in place to provide effective legal remedies for data
subjects and/or an ‘adequacy decision’ by the EU on the
level of protection offered by third country. Individuals must
also be informed of any further processing of personal data,
if those purposes are ‘incompatible’ with those for which
they were originally collected [33]. GDPR, thus, renders the
international distribution of data processing and data reuse
accountable to the data subject.
Data subject rights Individuals should, wherever possible,
also be informed as to the period for which data will be stored
and, in accordance with Article 15, should be able to access
their data via a secure remote system that enables individ-
uals to export their data in a ‘structured commonly used
machine-readable format’ as per the right to data portabil-
ity (Article 20). Other rights that must be made accountable
to the data subject include the right to lodge a complaint
(Article 15), the right to rectification (Article 16), and the
right to be forgotten and to erasure (Article 17). Where auto-
mated decision-making, including profiling, is applied then
the logic, significance and envisaged consequences of data
processing must be made accountable to the individual (Arti-
cle 13). Furthermore, individuals have the right not to be
subject to decisions based solely on automated data process-
ing which has significant effects (such as automatic refusal
of an online credit application) without the implementation
of measures that safeguard their rights, including the right to
obtain human intervention and to contest decisions (Article
22).
Consent is not simply a matter of obtaining permission to
process personal data then. It requires that data process-
ing be made accountable to individuals in terms of specific
(legally defensible) purposes that reveal any and all recipi-
ents of the data, data transfers (including EU authorisation
or legal safeguards), and further processing. The individ-
ual’s rights must also be made accountable, including the
right to complaint, rectification, and erasure, and the right
to online access (wherever possible) and data portability.
Automated processing producing legal effects must also be
made accountable to individuals and measures put in place
that safeguard their rights, including the right to human
intervention. These requirements must be articulated in an
‘intelligible and easily accessible form, using clear and plain
language’ (Article 12), and ‘at the time when personal data
are obtained’ (Article 13).
Satisfying the external accountability requirement is chal-
lenging in the IoT, and not only due to the fact that
data processing is routinely distributed across an ‘unobtru-
sive’ and ‘seamless’ infrastructure [34] in which connected
devices typically lack user interfaces and the communica-
tion of data is invisible. Challenging too is the shifting status
of the accountability requirement itself. Something which
has traditionally been construed of in engineering terms as a
‘non-functional’ requirement—a matter of providing infor-
mation to people (e.g., via terms and conditions or privacy
notices)—is shifting under GDPR into a ‘functional’ require-
ment and something that must, therefore, be built into the
IoT.
The emphasis GDPR puts on the “information to be
provided where personal data are collected from the data
subject” (Article 13) no doubt bolsters the non-functional
view. However, rights to do with online access and data porta-
bility clearly signal the shifting status of the accountability
requirement, and that it extends beyond the initial moment
of consent. While information will have to be provided
about a raft of processing issues from purpose to recipients,
data transfer and automated processing, the demonstration
of compliance with the external data subject accountability
requirement can no longer be reduced to the provision of
information ‘up front’, any more than it can be reduced to a
PIA. Accountability will need to be engineered into the IoT,
a point underscored by the Article 29 Working Party (WP29)
and the practical recommendations it proposes to manage the
‘data protection risks that lie within the ecosystem of the IoT’
by ‘implement[ing] privacy and data protection in products
and services’ [34].
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3 Implementing the external accountability
requirement
One of the key risks that attaches to the IoT from a Euro-
pean perspective is the potential for an opaque infrastructure
of connected devices to ‘dehumanise’ the world, ‘alienate’
people, and ‘reduce human freedom’ [29]. This is particu-
larly acute in a domestic context, which is seen to constitute a
‘mini IoT environment’ in its own right, capable of revealing
its inhabitants’ lifestyles, habits and choices. Ensuring that
end-users fully understand ‘the role, functioning and impact
IoT services can have on their lives’ thus becomes a critical
challenge (ibid.), which the external accountability require-
ment seeks to address. More than that, however, it seeks to
put end-users in control. Accountability is not simply about
explaining the IoT to people [9], it is about giving people the
tools to exercise control.
“User empowerment is essential in the context of IoT.
Data subjects and users must be able to exercise their
rights and thus be ‘in control’ of the data at any time
according to the principle of self-determination” [34]
In addition to furnishing end-users or individuals with
the information required by GDPR, WP29 recommends that
control turn on the implementation of a range of awareness
mechanisms. This recognizes that, at the current moment
in time at least, communication between devices in the IoT
ecosystem often occurs ‘without the individual being aware
of it’, which in turn makes it ‘extraordinarily difficult to
control the generated flow of data’. The lack of awareness
increases the risk of ‘excessive self-exposure’ and ‘functional
creep’ as data flows invisibly around the ecosystem. It is fur-
ther recognized that ‘classical mechanisms’ for promoting
awareness are difficult to apply in the IoT, given the seam-
less character of communications and the current inability for
connected devices to make the data they generate ‘reviewable
by the data subject prior to publication’. WP29, thus, recom-
mends that a number of practical measures be implemented
to increase awareness and reflexively put users in control
of the flow of data in the IoT. In addition to implementing
adequate security measures, these include:
Providing granular choice over data capture Device man-
ufacturers must provide users with granular choices over data
capture. The granularity should concern not only the cate-
gory of collected data, but also the time and frequency at
which data are captured. As a feature of granular choice, it is
also recommended that devices ‘inform’ users when they are
active, e.g., via a physical interface to a device or by broad-
casting a signal on a wireless channel, and similar to the do
not disturb feature on smartphones, that IoT devices offer a
‘do not collect’ option to quickly disable data collection.
Limiting data distribution In keeping with the data minimi-
sation principle and purpose limitation, IoT devices should
limit the amount of data leaving devices by transforming raw
data into aggregated data and deleting raw data as soon as
the data required for processing has been extracted. As a
principle, deletion should take place at the nearest point of
data collection of raw data and where possible directly on the
device.
Enforcing local control To ‘enforce user control’, IoT
devices should enable local controlling and processing enti-
ties allowing users to have a clear and transparent picture
of data collected by their devices and facilitating local stor-
age and processing without having to transmit the data to the
device manufacturer. Furthermore, IoT devices should pro-
vide tools enabling users to locally read, edit and modify the
data before they are transferred to any data controller.
It is also recommended, in keeping with GDPR (Article 7),
that users should be able to revoke consent and that the tools
provided to register this withdrawal should be ‘accessible,
visible and efficient.’ Such tools should allow users to con-
tinuously withdraw their consent ‘without having to exit the
service provided’ by connected devices. Furthermore, and
where relevant (e.g., with respect to smart appliances), in
withdrawing users should still be able to use the device in
‘unconnected’ mode.
The controls recommended by WP29 may sound severe
but are not dissimilar to the recommendations of the Fed-
eral Trade Commission (FTC), the chief agency tasked with
protecting personal data in the US. Accordingly, the FTC pro-
poses a number of practical measures to put the individual
in control of personal data generated by IoT devices. These
include the implementation of management portals or ‘dash-
boards’ that enable users to configure IoT devices; ‘privacy
menus’ enabling the application of user-defined privacy lev-
els across all of their IoT devices by default; the use of icons
on IoT devices to ‘quickly convey’ important settings and
attributes, such as when a device is connected to the Internet,
and to enable users to quickly ‘toggle the connection on or
off’; and the use of ‘out of band communications’ to relay
important privacy and security settings to the user via other
channels, e.g., via email or SMS.
“Properly implemented, such ‘dashboard’ approaches
can allow consumers clear ways to determine what
information they agree to share.” [10]
Clearly, there is some resonance between the FTC recom-
mendations and the granular choice measures proposed by
WP29, insofar as both are concerned to put computational
mechanisms in place that allow end-users to understand data
collection and control the flow of personal data in the IoT
ecosystem. There is agreement too on the ‘relevance and
importance’ of minimising data collection and that greater
transparency would ‘help customers and businesses by pro-
moting trust in the burgeoning IoT marketplace’ (ibid.),
though we note that there are no overarching principles of
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data minimisation or transparency in US data protection law
[14].
Nonetheless, seen through the lens of key agencies tasked
with implementing data protection in Europe and the US,
satisfying the external accountability requirement becomes
a matter of enabling individual control over the flow of per-
sonal data through the design of computational mechanisms
that provide for consent as an ongoing matter, make data
processing transparent, and permit fine-grained data flow
management. In Europe that requirement also extends to
computational mechanisms which enable online access and
data portability, and more radically that ‘local processing
entities’ be implemented to enforce control.
One direct implication of the local control recommen-
dation is that a great deal of the IoT data processing that
currently takes place in the cloud is moved to the edge of the
network.
“The edge of the Internet is a unique place … located
often just one wireless hop away from associated
… devices, it offers ideal placement for low-latency
offload infrastructure to support emerging applications
… It can be an optimal site for aggregating, analysing
and distilling bandwidth-hungry sensor data … In the
Internet of Things, it offers a natural vantage point
for … access control, privacy, administrative autonomy
and responsive analytics.” [3]
Moving data processing to the edge might not only mini-
mize but entirely dispense with the distribution of personal
data and the privacy threat that accompanies its distribution.
In doing so, there is not only the added benefit of low-latency
offload, but resilience in actuation (should the broader net-
work fail), and a significant reduction in data processing costs
to processing entities. It may also be the case that in moving
to the edge to meet the external accountability requirement,
we can open up personal data for innovation in privacy-
preserving, trust-building ways.
4 Accountability at the edge: the IoT
Databoxmodel
Under GDPR the external accountability requirement puts
the principle of self-determination into practice and thus
requires that consent be built into the IoT as an ongoing
matter, which means consent can no longer be reduced to
ticking a box on a device manufacturer’s or service provider’s
remote website; that data processing is transparent, and pro-
vided for through information clearly articulating specific
purposes, recipients, transfers, and the logic, significance
and consequences of automated processing; that data col-
lection is minimal and involves only that which is needed to
meet the purposes of processing; and that individuals be able
to access their data online and export it. Furthermore, it is
recommended that external accountability be implemented
through computational mechanisms that allow individuals to
exercise granular choice over data collection; limit data dis-
tribution and keep raw data as close to source as possible; and
permit local control allowing individuals to review the results
of processing operations prior to ‘publication’ or distribu-
tion. Limiting data distribution and permitting local control
inevitably nudges solutions enabling external accountability
to the edge of the network.
4.1 Origin and evolution of themodel
The IoT Databox model provides an in principle means of
implementing the external accountability requirement. The
model extends the Databox concept [2] to incorporate the IoT.
The Databox concept posits a physical device as a gateway
to a distributed platform and is predicated on the ‘Dataware
model’, which sought to develop a business to consumer
(B2C) service-oriented architecture providing a new wave of
personal digital services and applications to individuals [19].
This model posits a ‘user’ (by or about whom data is created),
‘data sources’ (e.g., connected devices, which generate data
about the user), a ‘personal container’ (which collates the data
produced by data sources and can be accessed via APIs), a
‘catalogue’ (which allows the user to manage access to the
personal container), and ‘data processors’ (external machines
exploited by parties, or ‘data controllers’ in GDPR terminol-
ogy, who wish to make use of the user’s data in some way).
The Dataware model is a logical entity formed as a
distributed computing system. Data processing involves
requests being sent to the catalogue, which are approved or
rejected by the user. If approved, the catalogue issues a pro-
cessing token to the data processor for permitted requests.
The processor presents the token to the personal container,
which accepts the token, runs the processing request on the
relevant data sources, and then returns processed results to
the data controller. The Dataware model represents a dis-
tinctive approach to personal data processing, that not only
seeks to enable user control but also data minimization. Thus,
the Dataware model takes a significant step towards imple-
menting the local control recommendation, minimising data
sharing to the results of processing. The raw data remains
‘on the box’ under the users control.
The Dataware model is currently being reconfigured
around the Databox concept, which embeds the Dataware
model in a physical object situated in the physical environ-
ment (e.g., a networked mini-computer in the home) under
the direct control of the individual. It allows the individual
to collate data from an array of data sources in a single place
and allows the individual to control access to them. Data
from individual data sources is stored in ‘data stores’, i.e.,
containerised, application-specific, processes [e.g., 22] that
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Fig. 1 Enabling external accountability: the IoT Databox Model
reduce the attack surface and management problems associ-
ated with general purpose operating systems.
4.2 Architecture of themodel
Architecturally the IoT Databox model consists of three key
components: the Databox, an app store (of which there may
be many), and third party processors (Fig. 1). Data processing
is done through apps that run on the Databox and are publi-
cally distributed by developers via the app store. The Databox
itself is a small form factor (×86 or ARM) computer consist-
ing of a collection of containerised system services including
the dashboard (Fig. 2), which provides Databox users with
a range of management functions including:
• Creating User Accounts on the Databox and activating
sharing permissions (e.g., that consent from all users of
shared resources is required for delete actions).
• Adding Data Sources to the box; including assigning
ownership to data sources, annotating data sources (e.g.,
smart plug X is ‘the kettle’), and sharing data sources
with other Databox users.
• Configuring Drivers to enable data sources to write to
data stores.
• Managing Data Stores; including sharing stores with
other Databox users, and redacting, clearing, or deleting
stores.
• Accessing App Stores; apps are recommended by the box
based on available data sources but individuals can also
search for, download, and rate apps.
• Sharing Apps, with other users within the home and
between distributed Databoxes in other homes; the Dash-
board also allows apps to be updated and deleted.
• Receiving Notifications; including the results of data
processing prior to distribution, sharing requests, app
updates, resource contention, etc.
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Fig. 2 The databox dashboard
• Auditing data processing operations; including all
accesses to data stores, and any data transactions.
The app store is a cloud-based service, interacted with using
standard internet protocols (principally HTTPS). It consists
of a web server that provides the app store UI supporting
human interaction, and a query API providing for program-
matic (machine-based) interaction. The app store manages
a docker repository [8] of apps, which are uploaded via the
app submission API and indexed by associated metadata.
4.3 App development
App developers are free to create their own containerised
apps as they wish, but the app store provides a dedicated app
SDK supporting the app building and publication process.
This is a cloud-hosted visual code editor based on IBM’s
open source Node-RED [24], which utilises a flow-based
programming paradigm in which black-box processes called
‘nodes’ are connected together to form applications called
‘flows’.
There are three principle node types:data sources,processes
and outputs. Process nodes are functions that operate on
data; they typically have a single input connection and one or
more output connections. Output nodes typically perform an
action, such as actuation, visualisation, or data export. Fig-
ure 3 depicts a flow taking the output from a microphone,
performs some processing on the data and updates a visuali-
sation, turns on one or more bulbs, and exports the processed
data to the cloud. It is composed of a single data source
(yellow node), three processes (blue nodes) and five outputs
(orange nodes).
The app editor smooths and simplifies the build–test–
deploy development workflow; it presents a high-level
abstraction (e.g., an app developer can build an app with-
out needing to be familiar with the interoperation between
sources, stores and drivers); it provides ‘scaffolding’ to help
build an app (e.g., developers can quickly inspect the struc-
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Fig. 3 The IoT Databox App SDK
ture and type of data entering and exiting a node); it provides
a full testing environment, where flows are deployed (as
containers) and connected to test data; it handles the app
publication process by presenting tools for building a ‘mani-
fest’ (Fig. 6) enabling end-user consent and granular choice;
and, upon submission, it containerises an app and uploads
it to the app store. The SDK also takes care of source code
management as all stages of the app development cycle are
recorded in a developer’s GitHub account.
4.4 Managing risk
Importantly the SDK also seeks to sensitize app developers to
the potential risks that accompany personal data processing.
We differentiate between three types of risk: legal risks asso-
ciated with GPDPR, particularly those implicated in taking
data off-the-box including data export within the EU, out-
side the EU, transfer to other recipients, the provision of
adequacy decisions or safeguards, and access; technological
risks, including apps that use devices that have not been vali-
dated by the SDK, use unverified code, or physically actuate
essential infrastructure or potential dangerous devices in the
home; and social risks, including apps that access sensitive
information or produce results that may be deemed sensitive
(as articulated, for example, by the notion of ‘special cate-
gories’ of personal data in Article 9 GDPR).We take the view
that app developers should be clear about the nature and level
of risk of posed by an app and provide precise information
about the risks they potentially expose users to.
We appreciate that identifying risk is challenging, given
that it can be introduced by any individual component of
a system (both hardware, such as sensors/actuators, and
software, such as drivers and apps) as well as arbitrary com-
binations of the two in particular operating contexts. Though
by no means infallible, the SDK generates a risk rating for
apps, based on the aggregate risk of the nodes from which
it is composed. Each node in the development environment
has a pre-defined spectrum of risk attached to it. The final
risk rating assigned to the node will sit within this spectrum,
and will be determined by how nodes are configured (e.g.,
the hardware they work with, the proposed data rate, the par-
ticular actuation to be performed, etc.). The SDK provides
developers with a view on potential risk in the course of app
construction (Fig. 4) in a bid to reduce risk in the IoT ecosys-
tem. The risk rating of apps is also made available to users
on the app store (Fig. 5) to further motivate and drive the
development of low risk and even no risk apps that do not
export data, provide users with granular choice over data sam-
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Fig. 4 SDK risk rating apps during development
pling and reporting frequency, provide online access if apps
take data of the box, clearly flag that they actuate essential
infrastructure in the home (e.g., central heating or windows
and doors), and exploit accredited hardware and trustworthy
software. Low-risk apps are visibly ‘checked’ in the app store
to display their Databox accredited status.
The risk rating assigned by the SDK is reflected in the
app store once uploaded. For apps built outside the SDK,
the app store reviews and rates them based on features and
information provided, e.g., the absence of an API providing
users with access to their data would result in a high-risk
rating if data were taken off-the-box by an app. Apps may
also be posted on the app store with an ‘unverified’ status,
in which case their risk rating will also be high. However,
an app cannot be posted on the app store or installed on the
IoT Databox without a ‘manifest’ being in place, and data
(i.e., the results of processing) cannot be transferred to a
controller’s processors without a manifest being completed
by the individual or data subject.
4.5 Enabling consent and granular choice
Manifests are ‘multi-layered notices’ [32], which (a) provide
a short description of the specific purpose of data process-
ing, (b) a condensed description providing the information
required by GDPR, and (c) full legal terms and conditions.
The IoT Databox also adds app information to the short
description, including user ratings and an app’s risk profile,
and enables control to be exercised over data collection at
device level (Fig. 6). Multi-layered notices are, thus, trans-
formed into dynamic, user-configurable consent mechanisms
that surface and articulate who wants to access which con-
nected devices and what they want to process personal data
for. Thus manifests make specific socio-technical data pro-
cessing arrangements, implicating connected devices, data
controller’s and their processors accountable to individuals
and available to local control.
Manifests provide an easy to read description in clear and
plain language of the data sources an app will use, and the
risks that attach to using the app. They also allow users to
exercise fine-grained granular choice over data collection,
selecting just which data sources may be used and, insofar
as connected devices permit, at which sampling frequencies
data will be gathered. Once a manifest has been configured by
the individual and has been installed it assumes the status of a
service level agreement (SLA), which the IoT Databox trans-
forms into a set of machine readable policies that enforce a
data processor’s access to the particular data sources agreed
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Fig. 5 At-a-glance risk (bars) and user ratings (stars)
upon by the individual and regulates subsequent data pro-
cessing operations. Apps, like data stores, run within isolated
containers and interact with data stores to perform a specified
(purposeful) task defined in the SLA. Thus apps may query
data stores, write to a communications data store that sends
query results to external machines, or write to a connected
device’s store to perform actuation. Data stores record all
actions performed on them (queries, external transactions and
actuation) in an audit log. Access to data stores are enforced
by the ‘arbiter’, which issues and manages the use of access
tokens.
4.6 Making data processing accountable
As more and more connected devices find their way into
the home, and an increasing array of apps consume personal
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Fig. 6 Manifest enabling
consent and granular choice
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Fig. 7 Building runtime accountability into apps
data and operate on users’ behalf, then we expect the ability
to inspect what has happened and why will be a necessary
feature of app usage. For example, I know my health insur-
ance app provides quotations based on my activity, grocery
shopping, location, and financial data, but just how has it
arrived at the quotes that it does? Alternatively, one might
wonder why the radiators in the living room were set to the
maximum at 3 A.M. yesterday, or why a large order of toilet
roll has appeared on the doorstep? Whatever the particular
case, GDPR makes it clear that the logic, significance and
consequences of automated processing be made accountable
to individuals. This may in part be provided in the informa-
tion contained in consent mechanisms as a preface to app use
but, as the above examples indicate, there is also a need to
build runtime accountability into the IoT.
To enable runtime accountability, and in addition to dash-
board notifications, apps created in our SDK are bundled with
an inspection interface that surfaces how an app ‘operates’,
i.e., how data flows through an app and how some action or
decision is arrived at, in order to support real-time interro-
gation by users. By way of example, Fig. 7 illustrates how
data is processed as it moves along the flow path. The path
summarises how energy data is used as part of a calculation
of a final score sent back to a third party to generate a home
insurance quote. The timestamp and watts listing displays the
raw data from the energy data source. When it is subsequently
processed by the first function node (in blue) it is transformed
into an occupancy matrix for times of the day, with the values
for house ‘occupied’ and ‘vacant’ represent probabilities in
the range from 0 to 1. Finally these data, alongside data from
other data sources implicated in the other flow paths (loca-
tion, alarm and door sensor data), are provided to the final
function to produce an overall score. As with our attempt
to convey potential risk, this is a nascent first step towards
enabling runtime accountability. Nonetheless we think it an
important area of research and topic of future work, partic-
ularly with respect to how an app’s operations are conveyed
to users, given the emphasis placed on automated processing
by GDPR.2
2 In discussion of this paper, it was asked if the Databox has mecha-
nisms in place to check consistency between the manifest and the actual
operation of the app? In the first instance, an app can only access stores
to which it has been granted access and this is enforced by the arbiter
component. In the second instance, the network component prevents
an app from exporting data directly—all data exports are done via the
export component and can only occur if permitted by an app’s manifest.
In third instance, the audit component logs all data stores accessed by an
app and all data exported by app. In the fourth instance, the data subject
can inspect the operations of an app (a) by previewing data processing
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5 Responding to the privacy challenge
GDPR requires that external data subject accountability be
built in to the digital ecosystem in a bid to respond to
the privacy challenges occasioned by the emerging digital
ecosystem. The Article 29 Working Party provides a num-
ber of practical recommendations as to how data protection
can be implemented in the IoT in particular. Together, these
legal requirements and recommendations suggest that meet-
ing the external data subject accountability requirement is a
matter of enabling individual control over the flow of per-
sonal data through the design of computational mechanisms
that (a) provide for consent as an ongoing matter, (b) make
data processing transparent, (c) permit fine-grained data flow
management, (d) allow online access and data portability,
and (e) exploit local processing entities to enforce control.
The IoT Databox model provides an in principle means of
meeting the external accountability requirement insofar as
it provides tangible computational mechanisms that address
these concerns.
Consent The requirement here is not only that users be able
to consent to data processing in the IoT, but also they can do
so as an ongoing matter and thus revoke consent. Consent
is provided for by the IoT Databox through dynamic multi-
layered notices, which do not sit at some remove from data
processing (e.g., on a remote website) but are installed on-
the-box where processing occurs. That means they can also
be uninstalled at any time by the user and data processing
be terminated at will. We cannot guarantee that a connected
device will still work, as per WP29 recommendations, but
that is a matter for device manufacturers to address.
Transparency The information required by GDPR to make
data processing transparent—including purpose specifica-
tion, recipients, transfers and salient details of automated
processing—is also provided by multi-layered notices. Addi-
tionally, the IoT Databox provides a raft of transparency
mechanisms articulating the potential risks that attach to
apps, dashboard notifications allowing users to review the
Footnote 2 continued
prior to data export, (b) by drilling down into data processing opera-
tions in detail, and (c) by inspecting the audit log. In the fifth instance,
it may also be possible to build apps that monitor the operations of apps
automatically.
It was also suggested in discussion that in enabling runtime account-
ability a potential conflict is revealed between what a third party might
want to disclose about the inner workings of data processing (e.g., how
an algorithm operates) and satisfying the external data subject account-
ability requirement. We agree, but GDPR is clear: the logic, significance
and consequences of automated processing, including profiling, must
be clearly accounted for (Article 13) insofar as data processing applies
to EU citizens. It would appear that there is no way of resolving poten-
tial conflict here other than to comply with the regulation, as a failure
to comply with the basic conditions of processing, including informed
consent, could result in devastating fines of up to ¤20,000,000 or 4% of
total annual worldwide turnover, whichever is higher (Article 83).
result of data processing, runtime accountability mechanisms
tracing data processing operations, and audit mechanisms
that allow users to inspect the historical operations of apps
on the box.
Fine-grained data flow management Multi-layered notices
also enable users to exercise granular choice over data col-
lection, insofar as connected devices provide a range of data
sampling frequencies. It is also the case that well-designed
apps can support granular choice in offering users a range of
reporting frequencies (e.g., continuous, hourly, daily, weekly,
monthly) built into multi-layered notices. The IoT Databox
additionally supports fine-grained data flow management in
limiting and minimising data distribution, aggregating data
on the box and only returning the results of processing to a
controller. Raw data thus remains on-the-box subject to user
control.
Access and portability Insofar as raw data remains on-the-
box, and audit mechanisms log all processing operations,
then data portability is non-issue in the IoT Databox model:
the data are always available and the results of specific queries
can always be recovered. Providing access to data that has
been transferred off-the-box is more problematic. Minimally
data controllers will have to provide a secure data endpoint
and an encrypted connection if they wish to take any data
off-the-box, which the box will monitor. While access is a
legal requirement under GDPR, we cannot enforce it. We
can encourage it, however, by attaching relatively high risk
profiles to apps that take data off-the-box but do not provide
online access and, where possible, recommending alterna-
tives.
Local control Situated at the edge of the network, the IoT
Databox enables local control, which is seen as key to user
empowerment. Taking computing to the data, rather than data
to the computing, provides individuals with strong privacy
management mechanisms. It also has potential computa-
tional advantages, decreasing latency, enhancing resilience
insofar as devices only need to talk to a local box rather
than a remote server, and decreasing network traffic insofar
as this approach is adopted at scale, not to mention greater
availability and access to data [13].
In limiting and even eradicating the need for remote data
processing, edge solutions may foster broad societal trust and
innovation, giving users the confidence to allow applications
to access personal and even private data with the assurance
that it will not be distributed but stay on the box or otherwise
be limited the results of a query, which may itself be termi-
nated. The possibility turns, of course, on it being possible to
route IoT devices through such devices as the IoT Databox.
That is, on device manufacturer’s enabling local control on
their products. However, even if they do not, and instead pro-
vide users with APIs for apps to access their data, the data
itself can still be collated on the IoT Databox and opened up
to broader use.
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5.1 Fit with the state of the art
We are not the first to espouse the virtues of privacy-
preserving platforms. A raft of Personal Data Stores (PDS)
have emerged over recent years. Many provide users, like
Mydex [23], with encrypted data stores distributed across
the cloud against which a wide a variety of third party appli-
cations can be run. Despite the phenomenal growth in PDS
solutions—the WEF reports that more than one a week was
launched between January 2013 and January 2014 alone
[37]—widespread public uptake has been problematic. Iron-
ically, a recent report suggests that this is due to ‘perceptions
of privacy and security risks’ individuals attach to storing
their personal data in the cloud [17].
Alternatives are provided by solutions such as openPDS
and HAT. OpenPDS [6] is hosted on either a smartphone or an
internet-connected hard drive situated in the home. OpenPDS
provides users with a centralized location for storing personal
data and exploits the ‘SafeAnswers’ approach [7] to com-
pute third-party queries inside a software sandbox within the
user’s PDS returning, like the IoT Databox, only the results of
processing not the raw data. HAT [36] provides users with a
personal container that also stores data client-side. Purpose-
built ‘data plugs’ fish personal data from APIs and deposit it
into a user’s personal HAT container. HAT-enabled applica-
tions access data through ‘data debits’, which permit access
to raw data in return for specific services. The primary pur-
pose of HAT is to create a marketplace that redresses the
current asymmetry in data harvesting and builds users into
the personal data value chain.
The MyData initiative [25] takes a different approach
again. It does not provide a PDS solution, but instead seeks
to enable consent management. MyData thus provides a dig-
ital service that focuses on managing and visualising data
use authorisations, rather than storing data itself. It seeks to
encourage service providers to build MyData APIs, which
enable their services to be connected with MyData accounts.
MyData APIs enable interaction between distributed data
sources and data users, and the MyData account provides
users with a single hub for granting services the authority to
access and use their personal data. While the MyData account
lets individuals activate or deactivate the sharing of specific
data flows and lists currently active authorisations, it does not
put further measures in place to limit access and minimise
data distribution.
Both MyData and HAT expose raw data to applications
and thus fail to limit the potential ‘function creep’ [34] that
currently characterises data processing in the IoT and results
in personal data flowing unfettered around the ecosystem.
Both openPDS and the IoT Databox put severe constraints
on the flow of data, minimising it to the results of data pro-
cessing. While this too has the potential to expose users in
ways they might not wish, e.g., through running multiple
applications from a developer that allows them to build rich
profiles from an array of returned results, the risk can be mit-
igated, e.g., through applications that monitor app usage and
notify users as to the potential inferences that can be drawn
from combined processing results.
Although openPDS is ‘aligned with the European Com-
mission’s reform of the data protection rules’ [6], the IoT
Databox seeks to respond directly to the external accountabil-
ity requirement mandated by GDPR. In doing so, it provides
users and developers with a more extensive set of tools for
GDPR compliant data processing in the IoT. Along with a
suite of computational mechanisms enabling consent, fine-
grained data flow management and transparency, not only of
what data is required for what purpose by whom but also
of runtime operations and processing results prior to dis-
tribution, the IoT Databox provides a dedicated application
development environment fostering a culture of accountabil-
ity in the IoT.
Furthermore, the IoT Databox moves beyond the ‘individual-
centric’ [7] approach adopted by openPDS and other solu-
tions. As [4] point out, most personal data do not belong
to a single individual but are social in nature, especially in
the IoT where connected devices are embedded in the fabric
and furniture of buildings. The ability to share devices, data,
and applications within and between homes, and to collec-
tively as well as individually manage data processing, is also
a unique feature of the IoT Databox model.
6 Conclusion
The European Union has introduced new data protection
regulation (GDPR) that comes into force in 2018. The regula-
tion is largely motivated by the effects of digital technology,
which make it difficult for individuals or data subjects to
know and understand whether, by whom and for what pur-
pose personal data are being collected and processed. The
European data protection agency WP29 views the IoT—an
infrastructure designed to communicate and exchange data
unobtrusively and in a seamless way—as particularly prob-
lematic, raising new and significant privacy challenges. The
regulation has global reach and applies regardless of whether
or not data processing takes place in the Union if it leverages
personal data to monitor or deliver goods and service to indi-
viduals in the Union. It is also punitive, exacting heavy fines
on data controller’s or parties who process personal data, and
otherwise provide individuals with the means to process per-
sonal data for household purposes, who flaunt the regulation.
A key pillar of the regulation is the accountability require-
ment:
“The controller shall be responsible for, and be able to
demonstrate compliance with ‘accountability’.” [12]
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Accountability has two distinct aspects to it. One ‘inter-
nal’, requiring that data processing entities demonstrate to
themselves that their operations comply with the regulation.
The other ‘external’, requiring that data processing entities
demonstrate to others, particularly supervisory authorities
and data subjects, that their operations comply with the
regulation. The demonstrations are not equivalent, and can-
not be provided for in the same ways. The external data
subject accountability requirement in particular requires a
raft of measures be put in place to enable consent, make
data processing transparent, permit fine-grained data flow
management, online access and data portability. Recom-
mendations from WP29 for IoT developers also advocate
providing granular choice, limiting data distribution, and
enabling local control to enforce user control over data pro-
cessing.
These mandated measures and recommendations mark
the shifting status of the external data subject accountabil-
ity requirement, from non-functional and the provision of
information to functional and the implementation of compu-
tational mechanisms that build accountability into the IoT.
This paper has sought to address how this might be achieved.
We have sketched out the external data subject requirement as
laid down by new regulation, and salient recommendations
provided by WP29 for making the IoT GDPR compliant,
and how these might be built into the ecosystem via the IoT
Databox model.
The model builds on prior work on B2C service ori-
ented architectures to enable a new wave of personal digital
services and applications to individuals. The IoT Databox
is an edge solution that implements the local control rec-
ommendation and collates personal data on a networked
device situated in the home. It meets the external account-
ability requirement by surfacing the interactions between
connected devices and data processors [9], and articulating
the social actors and activities in which machine-to-machine
interactions are embedded through a distinctive range of
computational mechanisms [26]:
Databox A physical networked device situated in the home
enabling users to exercise direct control over IoT devices
and to manage both internal (within the home) and exter-
nal (third party) access to the data they generate. The IoT
Databox puts the principle of data minimisation into effect,
taking computing to the data, and limiting the potential for
excessive self-exposure and function creep in executing pro-
cessing locally and only returning the results of third party
queries.
App store A familiar environment enabling users to access
data processing services and providing resources to make
informed choices about the services they wish to use, includ-
ing app verification, risk ratings, and feedback from the
user community. The app store puts the principle of self-
determination into effect, and allows individuals to exercise
direct control over the specific data processing operations
that run on the Databox.
Apps Apps provide a key interface for articulating the trans-
parency requirements of GDPR in terms of manifests, which
articulate who wants what data for what purposes along with
recipients of the data, data transfers, and the nature of any
automated processing that may be applied. App manifests
put the principle of informed consent into effect, and in being
dynamic objects (not just text) further allow users to exercise
granular choice over data collection to enable fine-grained
data flow management.
Dashboard The Databox dashboard enables individual and
collective management of data processing operations. It
allows users to exercise fine-grained control over device,
data and app use between Databox users both within and
between homes. It enables consent to be exercised in an
ongoing manner, including revoking it at any time. And pro-
vides further transparency mechanisms on data processing
operations, both at runtime and on completion, allowing indi-
viduals to terminate third party queries should they wish. The
dashboard thus enables individuals to exercise further fine-
grained control over data processing and the flow of data.
SDK The SDK provides developers with an environment
enabling accountability to be built into IoT Databox apps,
supporting manifest construction to meet the information
requirements of GDPR, enhanced granular choice over data
collection, and providing for runtime accountability in sur-
facing how data flows through an app and how some action
or decision is arrived at. The SDK also exploits a risk-based
framework to motivate development of GDPR compliant
apps providing access to data taken off-the-box.
In adopting the local control recommendation and moving
data processing to the edge of the network to ensure the indi-
vidual can control the flow of personal data, the IoT Databox
model may enhance the efficiency of data processing, make
actuation more resilient, minimize the impact of IoT traf-
fic on the network, and negate the need for costly privacy
regimes. Insofar as it is possible for data processing and data
to demonstrably stay on-the-box then the IoT Databox model
also holds the promise of opening up personal data, giving
individuals the confidence to allow data processing across
manifold sources of personal data rather than single con-
nected devices.
Nonetheless, we are aware that the IoT Databox model
is largely symbolic at this moment in time, a signal of what
might be possible if the challenges occasioned by edge [30]
and fog [18] computing can be overcome. It is also imper-
ative, as raised in discussion of this paper, that we validate
the IoT Databox model. This is a non-trivial task which can-
not simply be bolted onto a paper, but will involve manifold
evaluations across two key areas covering (a) the system and
(b) its use.
123
54 Journal of Reliable Intelligent Environments (2018) 4:39–55
We, thus, envisage validating the performance of the IoT
Databox model on different hardware, including relatively
powerful devices (such as Intel NUCs) and relatively cheap
devices (such as Raspberry Pi 3s), using various macro and
micro benchmarks. The former includes end-to-end bench-
marks which will assess temporal performance of the IoT
Databox model on different hardware platforms. The latter
will include evaluations of the memory footprint of compo-
nents as the number of apps, drivers and data sources scale up;
read/write performance of data stores as the number of stores
scales up; latency and throughput limitations introduced by
the networking component; the impact of logging; and any
constraints introduced by token minting and validation).
Technical measures are necessary but not sufficient to val-
idate the IoT Databox, it is also imperative that it meets
human need. Two stakeholder groups are of particular rele-
vance: industry and end users. We thus envisage verifying IoT
Databox utility from industry and end-user perspectives. This
will include documenting industry engagement, uptake and
use, which is already in progress through the development of
project partner use cases. It will also involve deploying the
IoT Databox in end-users’ homes and evaluating its use from
the mundane perspective of everyday life.
Despite its symbolic status, the IoT Databox model is not
a theoretical model. It exists [1,21], albeit in nascent form
and its source code is freely available for widespread use [5].
It enables data controllers and app developers working on
their behalf to demonstrate compliance with the external data
subject accountability requirement. Its ability to support local
computation minimises and even circumvents the widespread
threat to privacy occasioned by the IoT. And in circumventing
the privacy threat, it opens up new possibilities for exploiting
personal data in ways that build consumer confidence, and
with it widespread trust, into the IoT.
“Data protection must move from ‘theory to practice’
… accountability based mechanisms have been sug-
gested as a way [to] … implement practical tools for
effective data protection [31].”
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